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In the functional-typological literature two main functions of case-marking are 
distinguished. One motivation for case-marking is disambiguation, i.e. the need to 
distinguish between the arguments o f a two- or three-place relation. Another 
widely attested function of case involves the expression or identification o f specific 
semantic information. In this paper I will investigate the two functions of case- 
marking to see where they converge and diverge with respect to the semantic 
features of arguments that are case-marked. I will focus on the ‘strength’ of the 
arguments in relation to their case-marking.
1. Introduction
The ‘strength’ of arguments can be viewed as a function of their ‘discourse 
prominence’ or o f their degree of ‘typicality’ as a full-fledged argument. Under 
both perspectives, it can be argued that semantic features such as animacy and 
definiteness contribute to the strength of grammatical arguments. The aim of this 
paper is to explore the relation between the strength of nominal arguments and the 
‘meaning’ of case.
2. A functional perspective on case marking
I assume that in ergative-absolutive systems ergative case is assigned to the first 
argument x of a two-place relation R(x,y), while in nominative-accusative systems 
accusative case is assigned to the second argument^ of a two-place relation R(x,y). 
Morphologically unmarked (abstract) case is analysed as the absence of case. 
Nominative case in nominative-accusative systems, and absolutive case in 
ergative-absolutive patterns, is often unmarked. In many languages, ergative and 
accusative case are assigned only (or mainly) in transitive sentences, leaving the 
subject of an intransitive sentence without case. This can be functionally explained 
(Comrie 1989, Aissen 2003). In order to differentiate the subject from the object it 
is not necessary to mark them both; a case marker on one of them already serves to 
distinguish the two arguments. So, when x and y  are the two arguments o f a 
transitive clause, and z  is the one argument of an intransitive clause, then the 
picture that emerges under this function of case-marking is as follows. In ergative- 
absolutive languages x gets ergative case, while y  stays unmarked (called
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‘absolutive’ case, which is often the absence o f case). In nominative-accusative 
case systems, y  is marked, while x stays unmarked (called ‘nominative’ case). The 
only argument z  o f intransitive clauses stays unmarked in both case systems (thus, 
it patterns with the transitive object in ergative-absolutive languages and with the 
transitive subject in nominative-accusative languages). This function o f case- 
marking is generally referred to as the distinguishing or discriminating function.
The distinguishing function o f case is not its only fonction, however 
(Song 2001). Morphological cases are generally considered to express some kind 
of specific (e.g., thematic) information of the noun phrase that bears the case 
morphology. For instance, dependent on its case, a noun phrase can refer to the 
goal, the agent, or the experiencer o f an event, or it is interpreted with respect to a 
certain location or direction in space. This function of case marking is usually 
referred to as the identifying or indexing function of case. Both functions of case- 
marking seem to manifest themselves within the different (more syntactic and more 
semantic) domains of case-marking.
3. Case and argument strength
De Hoop and Narasimhan (2005) point out that, dependent on which function of 
case-marking is dominant in a certain language, different arguments may get case- 
marked, the ‘strong’ or the ‘weak’ ones. Cross-linguistically, the strength o f the 
arguments seems to influence case-marking. In de Hoop (1996) I suggested that in 
languages with differential case-marking, subjects and objects that are ‘strong’ are 
likely to be overtly case-marked. However, this does not always hold. In fact, 
sometimes the ‘weak’ rather than the strong arguments receive overt case-marking 
(cf. Aissen 1999, De Swart 2003, De Hoop and Narasimhan 2005).
The question is how we measure the ‘strength’ of arguments, since 
languages may vary in this respect. One notion that seems relevant in this respect is 
‘discourse prominence’. Legendre et al. (1993) use Optimality Theoretic 
constraints such as “High-prominence arguments receive Ci” and “Low- 
prominence arguments are not case-marked Q  and C2”, where C\ in their 
framework refers to both nominative and ergative, and C2 to both accusative and 
absolutive. According to Legendre et al., the one argument o f an intransitive clause 
is always high-prominent, and the two arguments of a transitive clause too. They 
write high-prominent arguments with capital letters. Thus, the subject and object of 
a transitive clause can be written as X and Y, and they are universally marked XjY2 
(where the subscript indicates the type of case). Legendre et a l (1993) argue that 
passivization applies when the input transitive clause has a low-prominent subject 
(xY) , while antipassives are the result of an input with a low-prominent object 
(Xy). However, they do not account for the fact that passives are found more often 
in nominative-accusative languages, while antipassives are found more often in 
ergative languages (Malchukov, to appear).
Moreover, if we compare two transitive clauses, e.g., Jane hit Jacky on 
the one hand, and Jane was drinking wine on the other, then intuitively wine is less 
prominent in the discourse than Jacky. Hence, we should use the input Xy for the 
sentence Jane was drinking wine although syntactically this is not an antipassive
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construction in English. So, another way of measuring the ‘strength’ of an 
argument is by looking at its typicality as a full-fledged argument (of a transitive 
clause) (Hopper and Thompson 1980). Animate and specific arguments are more 
often realized as ‘real’ arguments than inanimate and non-specific arguments. Note 
that in fact the different ways o f measuring the ‘strength’ of arguments point in the 
same direction: arguments which are high-prominent in the discourse are usually 
animate and specific, whereas arguments that are ‘typical’ arguments are usually 
animate and specific as well.
4. Markedness
One o f the fundamental insights of functional typology is that the most typical 
instances of a certain category are the least likely to be marked (cf. Silverstein 
1976). For example, following Comrie (1989), Aissen (2003) notes that an object 
without case morphology is used for a typical (i.e., semantically unmarked) object 
in languages that show Differential Object Marking (DOM). A semantically 
unmarked object is a ‘weak’ object, for example a non-specific object. If, on the 
other hand, the object is specific, the meaning is considered marked (for an object), 
hence the object will be case-marked. Hindi provides an example of this type of 
case-altemation.
(1) us=ne ek 
he=ERG one 
“He sold a goat.”
(2) us=ne ek 
he=ERG one 
“He sold the goat.”
Naess (2004), however, points out that, from a language typological point of view, 
one could also claim that the object in (2) is typical rather than the one in (1). Her 
argument is that in languages that have transitive constructions at all, sentences like
(2) are always transitive, whereas languages differ in whether they express 
sentences like (1) as transitive constructions. Take for example the alternation 
between (3) and (4) from Greenlandic Eskimo (Bittner 1988):
(3) Jaaku ama-mik tuqut-si-v-uq
Jacob woman-IN STR kil 1-AP-IN D-3 sN O M 
“Jacob killed a woman.”
(4) Jaaku-p arnaq tuqut-p-as 
Jacob-ERG woman kill-IND-3sERG/3sNOM 
“Jacob killed the woman.”
Note that in (3) the ‘direct object’ or the y  argument is weak/non-specific, whereas 
it is strong/specific in (4). Yet, only (4) is a true transitive construction with 
ergative case on the subject and both subject and object agreement on the verb, 
whereas (3) is in fact an intransitive, more specifically an antipassive construction
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bakraa becaa 
goat sold
bakre=ko becaa
goat=ACC sold
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and its only ‘true’ argument (the subject) is therefore unmarked for case, whereas 
the ‘object’ is marked with oblique (instrumental) case. The question is how one 
can maintain that a typical direct object in a transitive clause (i.e., its meaning) is 
non-specific, if this type o f object is very often not a grammatical object at all 
from a morpho-syntactic perspective point o f view (i.e., its form).
The standard views on this issue largely diverge. Whereas Comrie (1989), 
Aissen (2003), and De Swart (2003) claim that (1) is an example of an unmarked 
transitive, Hopper & Thompson (1980), Legendre et al. (1993), and Naess (2004) 
take the opposite view, and claim that sentences like (2) where both arguments are 
high-prominent in the discourse are truly transitive.
‘Transitive’ verb phrases consisting o f a verb and a noun phrase can thus 
be composed in different ways. For instance, the verb can be straightforwardly 
transitive (<e,<e,t>>) in the sense that it denotes a relation between two equal 
arguments, or the verb is formally intransitive (or detransitivized by an antipassive 
marker) and its object functions more or less as a predicate modifier (type 
<<e,t>,<e,t>>) (cf. de Hoop 1996). Languages can differ in what counts as ‘more 
marked’.
5. So, what does case mark?
Case-marking in order to identify arguments can be illustrated as follows:
Figure 1: The identifying function of case (de Hoop and Narasimhan 2005)
|-------  |-------  |--------  |--------  |_-> (Argument strength)
X x Y y
I I
case case
Clearly, in its identification function, case-marking identifies strong arguments as 
these function as the typical arguments of a transitive verb (the ‘true’ subjects and 
the ‘true’ objects). So, under the identifying function case is expected to mark the 
strong subjects and objects in a transitive clause. Note that the identification 
function is not limited to the core arguments o f transitive sentences. Aristar (1997) 
points out that the strength of noun phrases (in particular, animacy and 
definiteness) influences other types of case-marking as well. For example, in 
Yidiny inanimate nouns are marked by locative case, whereas animate nouns that 
get a similar locative meaning, are marked by dative case (Dixon 1977):
(5) dajbu-: wunar) djarjga 
ground-LOC exist hole 
“There are holes in the ground.”
(6) bur|a:-nda wunat| djar|ga 
woman-DAT exist hole 
“There are holes in women.”
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Aristar argues that it is not animacy per se that plays a role, but rather discourse 
prominence in general. The following dialogue shows that when a locative 
inanimate noun phrase is high-prominent it is marked by dative case (Dixon 1977).
(7) T|ayu djana:-n naru walba-:
I stood top stone-LOC
“I stood on top of a stone.”
(8) nundu djana:-n naru walba:-nda 
you stood top stone-DAT
“Oh, you stood on top of the stone!”/ “It was a stone you stood on top of.”
Clearly, the identifying function of case can be argued to mark strong noun 
phrases, independent of their semantic role or syntactic function.
As was pointed out above, differential case-marking can also be employed 
to distinguish between subjects and objects. Since subjects are usually stronger 
than objects, obviously, differential case-marking on the basis of distinguishability 
marks weak subjects rather than strong ones because the weak ones are ‘closer’ to 
the objects in strength. On the other hand, strong objects get case-marked and not 
the weak ones, because in the case of objects, the strong ones are ‘closer’ to the 
subjects. This is illustrated as follows:
Figure 2: The distinguishing function o f case (de Hoop and Narasimhan 2005)
|-------  |-------  |--------  |--------  |--> (Argument strength)
X x Y y
I I
case case
Comparing figures 1 and 2, an essential difference between the two functions of 
case-marking is revealed. While the identifying function explains case-marking of 
the strong subject and the strong object (the X  and the Y), the distinguishing 
function explains case-marking of the weak subject and the strong object (the x and 
the Y).
5. Conclusion
When case-marking is merely used to distinguish two arguments in a transitive 
clause, it is sufficient to mark only one o f the two arguments. By contrast, when 
case-marking is used to identify the strength or prominence of an argument, it may 
apply to each argument independently, both the subject and the object of a 
transitive clause, as well to other noun phrases. Here, the two functions of case- 
marking diverge. Moreover, while the identifying function explains case-marking 
of the strong subject and the strong object, the distinguishing function explains 
case-marking of the weak subject and the strong object.
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